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## THE CAUSES OF RACE SUPERIORITY.

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The superiorities that, at a given time, one people may display over other peoples, are not necessarily racial. Physical inferiorities that disappear as the peoples are equalized in diet and dwelling; mental inferiorities that disappear when the peoples are levelled up in respect to culture and means of education, are due not to race but to condition, not to blood but to surroundings. In accounting for disparities among peoples there are, in fact, two opposite errors into which we may fall. There is the equality fallacy inherited from the earlier thought of the last century, which belittles race differences and has a robust faith in the power of intercourse and school instruction to lift up a backward folk to the level of the best. Then there is the counter fallacy, grown up since Darwin, which exaggerates the race factor and regards the actual differences of peoples as hereditary and fixed.

Just now the latter error is, perhaps, the more besetting. At a time when race is the watchword of the vulgar and when sciolists are pinning their faith to breed, we of all men ought to beware of it. We Americans who have so often seen the children of underfed, stunted, scrub immigrants match the native American in brain and brawn, in wit and grit, ought to realize how much the superior effectiveness of the latter is due to social conditions. Keleti, from his investigations in Hungary, has come to the conclusion that in most of the communes there the people have less to eat than is necessary to live and work, the result being alcoholism, weakness, disease and early death. Atwater, on the other hand, has found that the average wage-worker in New England consumes more food than health requires.

What a host of consequences issue from this one primary contrast !

A generation ago, in the first enthusiasm over the marvels of heredity, we were taught that one race is monotheistic, another has an affinity for polytheism. One race is temperamentally aristocratic, while another is by instinct democratic. One race is innovating and radical, another is by nature conservative. But it is impossible to characterize races in respect to such large complex traits. A keener analysis connects these great historical contrasts with a number of slight specific differences in body or temperament. For example, four diverse traits of the greatest social importance, namely, progressiveness, the spirit of adventure, migrancy and the disposition to flock to cities, can be traced to a courageous confidence in the unknown coupled with the high physical tone that calls for action. Similarly, if we may believe Signor Ferrero, of two equally gifted races the one that is the less sensual will be inferior in æsthetic output, less apt to cross with lower types, more loyal to the idea of duty, better adapted to monotonous factory labor, and more inclined to the Protestant form of religion. It is only by establishing fixed, specific differences of this kind that we can hope to explain those grand race contrasts that enchant the historian.

The first cause of race superiority to which I invite your attention is a physiological trait, namely, *climatic adaptability*. Just now it is a grave question whether the flourishing and teeming peoples of the North Temperate zone can provide outlets for their surplus population in the rich but undeveloped lands of the tropics. Their superiority, economic and military, over the peoples under the vertical sun is beyond cavil. But can they assert and profit by this superiority save by imposing on the natives of the tropics the odious and demoralizing servile relation? Can the white man work and multiply in the tropics, or will his rôle be limited to commercial and industrial exploitation at a safe

distance by means of a changing, male contingent of soldiers, officials, business agents, planters and overseers?

The answer is not yet sure, but the facts bearing on acclimatization are not comforting to our race. Immunity from the fevers that waste men in hot, humid climates seems to be in inverse ratio to energy. The French are more successful in tropical settlement than the Germans or the English. The Spanish, Portuguese and Italians surpass the French in almost equal measure. When it comes to *settling* Africa, instead of merely exploring or subduing it, the peoples may unexpectedly change their rôles. With all their energy and their numbers the Anglo-Saxons appear to be physiologically inelastic, and incapable of making of Guiana or the Philippines a home such as they have made in New Zealand or Minnesota. In the tropics their very virtues—their push, their uncompromising standards, their aversion to intermarriage with the natives—are their destruction.

Ominous, on the other hand, is the extraordinary power of accommodation enjoyed by the Mongolians. Says Professor Ripley: "The Chinese succeed in Guiana where the white man cannot live; and they thrive from Siberia where the mean temperature is below freezing, to Singapore on the equator." There are even some who believe that the Chinaman is destined to dispossess the Malay in south-western Asia and the islands of the Pacific, and the Indian in the tropical parts of South America.

There is, indeed, such a thing as acclimatization; but this is virtually the creation at a frightful cost of a new race variety by climatic selection. We may therefore regard his lack of adaptability as a handicap which the white man must ever bear in competing with black, yellow, or brown men. His sciences and his inventions give him only a temporary advantage, for, as the facilities for diffusion increase, they must pass to all. Even his educational and political institutions will spread wherever they are suitable. All precedence founded on the possession of magazine rifles, or

steam, or the press, or the Christian religion, must end as these elements merge into one all-embracing, everywhere diffused, cosmopolitan culture. Even the advantage conferred upon a race by closer political cohesion, or earlier development of the state, cannot last. Could we run the coming centuries through a kinetoscope, we should see all these things as mere *clothes*. For, in the last analysis, it is solely on its persistent physiological and psychological qualities that the ultimate destinies of a race depend.

The next truth to which I invite your attention is, that one race may surpass another in *energy*. The average of individual energy is not a fixed race attribute, for new varieties are constantly being created by migration. The voluntary, unassisted migration of individuals to lands of opportunity tends always to the upbuilding of highly energetic communities and peoples. To the wilderness go, not the brainiest or noblest or highest bred, but certainly the strongest and the most enterprising. The weakling and the sluggard stay at home, or, if they are launched into the new conditions, they soon go under. The Boers are reputed to be of finer physique than their Dutch congeners. In America, before the days of exaggerated immigration, the immigrants were physically taller than the people from which they sprang, the difference amounting in some instances to an average of more than an inch. By measurements taken during the Civil War the Scotch in America were found to exceed their countrymen by two inches. Moreover, the recruits hailing from other states than those in which they had been born were generally taller than those who had not changed their residence. The Kentuckians and the Texans have become proverbial for stature, while the surprising tallness of the ladies who will be found shopping, of an afternoon, on Kearney street in San Francisco, testifies to the bigness of the "forty-niners." Comparative weights tell the same tale. Of the recruits in our Civil War, the New Englanders weighed 140 pounds, the Middle State men 141

pounds, the Ohians and Indianans 145 pounds, and the Kentuckians 150. Conversely, where, as in Sardinia, the population is the leavings of continued emigration, the stature is extraordinarily low.

This principle that repeated migrations tend to the creation of energetic races of men, opens up enchanting vistas of explanation in the jungle of history. Successive waves of conquest breaking over a land like Sicily or India may signify that a race, once keyed up to a high pitch of energy by gradual migration from its ancient seats, tends to run down as soon as such beneficent selections are interrupted by success, and settlement in a new home. Cankered by a long quiet it falls a prey in a few centuries to some other people that has likewise been keyed up by migration.

Again, this principle may account for the fact that those branches of a race achieve the most brilliant success which have wandered the farthest from their ancestral home. Of the Mongols that borrowed the old Babylonian culture, those who pushed across Asia to the Yellow Sea, have risen the highest. The Arabs and Moors that skirted Africa and won a home in far-away Spain, developed the most brilliant of the Saracenic civilizations. Hebrews, Dorians, Quirites, Rajputs, Hovas were far invaders. No communities in classic times flourished like the cities in Asia created by the overflow from Greece. Nowhere under the Czar are there such vigorous, progressive communities as in Siberia. By the middle of this century, perhaps, the Russian on the Yenesei or the Amur will be known for his "push" and "hustle" as is to-day the American on Lake Michigan or Puget Sound. It is perhaps on this principle that the men who made their way to the British Isles have shown themselves the most masterful and achieving of the Germanic race; while their offshoots in America and Australia, in spite of some mixture, show the highest level of individual efficiency found in any people of the Anglo-Saxon breed. Even in America there is a difference between the

East and the West. The listlessness and social decay noticeable in many of the rural communities and old historic towns on the Atlantic slope, are due, no doubt, to the loss of their more energetic members to the rising cities and to the West.

There is no doubt that the form of society which a race adopts is potent to paralyze or to release its energy. In this respect Americans are especially fortunate, for their energies are stimulated to the utmost by democracy. I refer not to popular government, but to the fact that with us social status depends little on birth and much on personal success. I will not deny that money, not merit, is frequently the test of social standing, and that Titania is often found kissing "the fair long ears" of some Bottom; but the commercial spirit, even if it cannot lend society nobility or worth, certainly encourages men to strive.

Where there is no rank or title or monarch to consecrate the hereditary principle, the capillarity of society is great, and ambition is whetted to its keenest edge. For it is hope not need that animates men. Set ladders before them and they will climb until their heart-strings snap.

Without a social ladder, without infection from a leisure class that keys up its standard of comfort, a body of yeomen settling in a new and fertile land will be content with simplicity and rude plenty. A certain sluggishness prevails now among the Boers, as it prevailed among the first settlers beyond the Alleghenies. If, on the other hand, there is a social ladder, but it is occupied by those of a military or hereditary position, as in the Spanish communities of the southwest, there is likewise no stimulus to energy. But if vigorous men form new communities in close enough touch with rich and old communities to accept their exacting standards of comfort, without at the same time accepting their social ranking, each man has the greatest possible incentive to improve his condition. Such has been the relation of America to England, and of the West to the East.

This is why America spells Opportunity. Inspired by hope and ambition the last two generations of Americans have amazed the world by the breathless speed with which they have subdued the western half of the continent, and filled the wilderness with homes and cities. Never has the world seen such prodigies of labor, such miracles of enterprise, as the creation within a single lifetime of a vast ordered, civilized life between the Mississippi and the Pacific. Witnessing such lavished expenditures of human force, can we wonder at American "rush," American nervousness and heart failure, at gray hairs in the thirties and old age in the fifties, at our proverb "Time is money!" and at the ubiquitous American rocking chair or hammock which enables a tired man to rest very quickly!

Closely related to energy is the virtue of *self-reliance*. There is a boldness which rises at the elbow touch of one's fellows, and there is a stout-heartedness which inspires a man when he is alone. There is a courage which confronts resolutely a known danger, and a courage which faces perils unknown or vague. Now, it is this latter quality—self-reliance—which characterizes those who have migrated the oftenest and have migrated as individuals. On our frontier has always been found the Daniel Boone type, who cared little for the support of his kind and loved danger and adventure for its own sake. The American's faith in himself and confidence in the friendliness of the unknown may be due to his enlightenment, but it is more likely the unapprehensiveness that runs in the blood of a pioneering breed. Sometimes, as in the successive trekkings of the Boers from Cape Town to the Limpopo, the trait most intensified is independence and self-reliance. Sometimes, as in the settling of the Trans-Mississippi region, the premium is put on energy and push. But in any case voluntary migration demands *men*.

Even in an old country, that element of the population is destined to riches and power which excels in self-reliance and enterprise. Cities are now the places of opportunity

and of prosperity, and it has been shown conclusively that, in the urban upbuilding now going on in Central Europe, where long-skull Teutons and broad-skull Celto-Slavs are mingled, the cities are more Teutonic than the rural districts from which their population is recruited. The city is a magnet for the more venturesome, and it draws to it more of the long-skulled race than of the broad-skulled race. In spite of the fact that he has no greater wit and capacity than the Celt, the Teuton's superior migrancy takes him to the foci of prosperity, and procures him a higher reward and a superior social status.

Wherever there is pioneering or settlement to do, self-reliance is a supreme advantage. The expansion of the English-speaking peoples in the nineteenth century—the English in building their Empire, the Americans in subduing the West—seems to be due to this trait. Self-reliance is, in fact, a sovereign virtue in times of ferment or displacement. In static times, however, other qualities outweigh it, and the victory may fall to those who are patient, obedient, and quick-witted, rather than to the independent in spirit. If this be so, then the great question of the hour. What is to be the near destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race? involves the question whether we stand on the threshold of a dynamic, or a static epoch. If the former, well for the Anglo-Saxon; if the latter, it may be the Latins who, renewing their faith in themselves, will forge ahead.

I think there can be no doubt that we are entering a tumultuously dynamic epoch. Science, machinery and steam—our heritage from the past century—together constitute a new economic civilization which is destined to work in the world a transformation such as the plow works among nomads. Two centuries ago Europe had little to offer Asia in an industrial way. Now, in western Europe and in America, there exists an industrial technique which alters the face of society wherever it goes. The exploitation of nature and man by steam and machinery directed by techni-

cal knowledge, has the strongest of human forces behind it, and nothing can check its triumphant expansion over the planet. The Arab spreads the religion of Mahomet with the Koran in one hand and the sword in the other. The white man of to-day spreads his economic gospel, one hand on a Gatling, the other on a locomotive.

It will take at least two or three generations to level up the industrial methods of continents like South America or Africa or Asia, as a Jamaica, a Martinique, or a Hawaii have been levelled up; and all this time that race which excels in energy, self-reliance and education will have the advantage. When this furiously dynamic epoch closes, when the world becomes more static, and uniformism recurs, self-reliance will be at a discount, and the conditions will again favor the race that is patient, laborious, frugal, intelligent and apt in consolidation. Then, perhaps, the Celtic and Mediterranean races will score against the Anglo-Saxon.

For economic greatness perhaps no quality is more important than *foresight*. To live from hand to mouth taking no thought of the morrow, is the trait of primitive man generally, and especially of the races in the tropical lands where nature is bounteous, and the strenuous races have not yet made their competition felt. From the Rio Grande to the Rio de la Plata, the laboring masses, largely of Indian breed, are without a compelling vision of the future. The Mexicans, our consuls write us, are "occupied in obtaining food and amusement for the passing hour without either hope or desire for a better future." They are always in debt, and the workman hired for a job asks something in advance to buy materials or to get something to eat. "Slaves of local attachments" they will not migrate in order to get higher wages. In Ecuador the laborer lets to-morrow take care of itself and makes no effort to accumulate. In Guiana, where Hindoos, Chinese, Portuguese, and Creoles labor side by side, the latter squander their earnings while the immigrants from the old economic civilizations all lay by in order to

return home and enjoy. In Colombia the natives will not save, nor will they work in order to supply themselves with comforts. In British Honduras the natives are happy-go-lucky negroes who rarely save and who spend their earnings on festivals and extravagances, rather than on comforts and decencies. In Venezuela the laborers live for to-day and all their week's earnings are gone by Monday morning. The Brazilians work as little as they can and live, and save no money; are satisfied so long as they have a place to sleep and enough to eat.

Since, under modern conditions, abundant production is bound up, not so much with patient toil, as with the possession of ample capital, it is evident that, in the economic rivalry of races, the palm goes to the race that discounts the future least and is willing to exchange present pleasures for future gratifications most nearly at par. The power to do this depends partly on a lively imagination of remote experiences to come, partly on the self-control that can deny present cravings, or resist temptation in favor of the thrifty course recommended by reason. We may, in fact, distinguish two types of men, the sensori-motor moved by sense-impressions and by sensory images, and the ideo-motor moved by ideas. For it is probable that the provident races do not accumulate simply from the liveliness of their anticipation of future wants or gratifications, but from the domination of certain ideas. The tenant who is saving to build a cottage of his own is not animated simply by a picture of coming satisfactions. All his teaching, all his contact with his fellows, conspire to make "home" the goal of his hopes, to fill his horizon with that one radiant idea. So in the renter who is scrimping in order to get himself a farm as in the immigrant who is laying by to go back and "be somebody" in the old country, the attraction of a thousand vaguely imagined pleasures is concentrated in one irresistible idea. The race that can make *ideas* the lodestars of life is certain to supplant a race of impulsivists absorbed in sensations, and recollections or anticipations of sensations.

It is certain that races differ in their attitude toward past and future. M. Lapie has drawn a contrast between the Arab and the Jew. The Arab *remembers*; he is mindful of past favors and past injuries. He harbors his vengeance and cherishes his gratitude. He accepts everything on the authority of tradition, loves the ways of his ancestors, forms strong local attachments, and migrates little. The Jew, on the other hand, turns his face toward the future. He is thrifty and always ready for a good stroke of business, will, indeed, join with his worst enemy if it pays. He is calculating, enterprising, migrant and ambitious.

An economic quality quite distinct from foresight is *the value sense*. By this I mean that facility of abstraction and calculation which enables a man to fix his interest on the value in goods rather than on the goods themselves. The mere husbandman is a utility perceiver. He knows the power of objects to keep human beings alive and happy, and has no difficulty in recognizing what is good and what is not. But the trader is a value perceiver. Not what a thing is good for, but what it will fetch, engages his attention. Generic utilities are relatively stable, for wine and oil and cloth are always and everywhere fit to meet human wants; but value is a chameleon-like thing, varying greatly from time to time and place to place and person to person. The successful trader dares form no fixed ideas with regard to his wares. He must pursue the elusive value that hovers now here and now there, and be ready at any moment to readjust his notions. He must be a calculator. He must train himself to recognize the abstract in the concrete and to distill the abstract out of the concrete. Economically, then, the trader is to the husbandman what the husbandman is to the hunter. The appearance of cities, money, and commerce puts a premium on the man who can perceive value. He accumulates property and founds a house, while his less skillful rival sinks and is devoured by war and by labor.

All through that ancient world which produced the Phœ-

neean, the Jew, the Greek and the Roman, the acquisition of property made a difference in survival we can hardly understand to-day. Our per capita production is probably three or four times as great as theirs was, and hence the grain-handlers of Buffalo are vastly more able to maintain a family than were the grain-handlers of old Carthage or Alexandria. All around the Mediterranean trade prospered the value perceivers, and that type tended to multiply and tinge more and more the psychology and ideals of the classic world. In ancient society the difference in death rates and in family-supporting power of the various industrial grades exceeded anything we are familiar with, and hence those who were steady and thrifty in labor or shrewd and prudent in trade vastly improved their chances of survival. Thus the economic man multiplied, and commercial, money-making Byzantium rose on the ruins of the old races. "Long before the seat of empire was moved to Constantinople," says Mr. Freeman, "the name of Roman had ceased to imply even a presumption of descent from the old patricians and plebeians." "The Julius, the Claudius, the Cornelius of those days was for the most part no Roman by lineal descent, but a Greek, a Gaul, a Spaniard or an Illyrian."

Between the economic type and the military type there is abrupt contrast, and the social situation cannot well favor them both at the same time. The warrior shows passional courage and the sway of impulse and imagination. The trader is calculating, counts the cost, and prizes a whole skin. From the second century B. C. the substitution of this type for the old, heroic, Cincinnatus type went on so rapidly that a recent writer finds congenital cowardice to be the mark of the Roman Senate and nobility during the empire. We all know the brilliant picture that Mr. Brooks Adams, in his "Law of Civilization and Decay," has given of the replacement of the military by the economic type in western Europe since the Crusades.

If this hypothesis be sound, the value perceiving sense is to be looked for in old races that have long known cities, money and trade. The Jew came under these influences at least twelve centuries earlier than did our Teutonic ancestors and has therefore had about forty or fifty generations the start of us in becoming economic. Equal or even greater is the lead of the Chinaman. It is, then, no wonder that the Jews and the Chinese are the two most formidable mercantile races in the world to-day, just as, in the Middle Ages, the Greeks and the Italians were the most redoubtable traffickers and money-makers in Europe. The Scotchman, the Fleming, and the Yankee, minor and later economic varieties developed in the West, can, indeed, exist alongside the Jew. The less mercantile German, however, fails to hold his own, and vents his wrath in Anti-Semitism. The Slav, unsophisticated and rural, loses invariably in his dealings with the Jew, and so harshly drives him out in vast numbers.

May we not, then, conveniently recognize two stages in the development away from the barbarian? Hindoos, Japanese, North Africans and Europeans, in their capacity for steady labor, their foresight, and their power to save, constitute what I will call *the domesticated races*. But the Jews, the Chinese, the Parsees, the Armenians, and in general the peoples about the Mediterranean constitute *the economic races*. The expurgated and deleted Teuton of the West, on the other hand, is more recently from the woods, and remains something of the barbarian after all. We see it in his migratoriness, his spirit of adventure, his love of dangerous sports, his gambling propensities, his craving for strong drink, his living up to his standard of comfort whether he can afford it or not. In quest of excitement he betakes himself to the Far West or the Klondike, whereas the Jew betakes himself to the Board of Trade or the Bourse. In direct competition with the more economic type the Anglo-Saxon is handicapped by lack of patience and financial acumen, but still his virtues insure him a rich portion. His energy and self-

reliance locate him in cities and in the spacious, thriving parts of the earth where the economic reward is highest. Born pioneer, he prospects the wilderness, pre-empting the richest deposits of the precious metals and skimming the cream from the resources of nature. Strong in war and in government, he jealously guards his own from the economic races, and meets finesse with force; so that despite his less developed value sense, more and more the choice lands and the riches of the earth come into his possession and support his brilliant yet solid civilization.

It is through no inadvertence that I have not brought forward *the martial traits* as a cause of race superiority. I do not believe that the martial traits apart from economic prowess are likely in the future to procure success to any race. When men kill one another by arms of precision instead of by stabbing and hacking, the knell is sounded for purely warelike races like the Vandals, the Huns and the Turks. Invention has so completely transformed warfare that it has become virtually an extra-hazardous branch of engineering. The factory system receives its latest and supreme application in the killing of men. Against an intelligent force equipped with the modern specialized appliances of slaughter no amount of mere warlike manhood can prevail. The fate of the Dervishes is typical of what must more and more often occur when *men* are pitted against properly operated lethal *machinery*.

Now, the war factory is as expensive as it is effective. None but the economic races, up to their eyes in capital and expert in managing machinery, can keep it running long. Warfare is becoming a costly form of competition in which the belligerents shed each other's treasure rather than each other's blood. A nation loses, not when it is denuded of men, but when it is at the end of its financial resources. War is, in fact, coming to be the supreme, economic touchstone, testing systems of cultivation and transportation and banking, as well as personal courage and military organization.

At the same time that war is growing more expensive it is becoming less profitable. The fruits of victory are often mere apples of Sodom. A decent respect for the opinion of mankind debars a civilized people from massacring the conquered in order to plant its own colonists on their land, from enslaving them, from bleeding them with heavy and perpetual tribute. Fortunate, indeed, is the victor if he can extort enough to indemnify him for his outlay. Therefore, at the very moment that the cost of war increases, the declining profits of war stamp it as an industry of decreasing returns. Wealth is a means of procuring victory, but victory is no longer a means of procuring wealth. A non-martial race may easily become victorious by means of its prosperity, but it will be harder and harder for a non-economic race to become prosperous by means of its victories. Even now the Turks in Europe are declining in numbers, and in spite of Armenian massacres the industrial races of the empire are growing up through the top-dressing of oppressors. It would seem safe to say that the purely war-like traits no longer insure race survival and expansion, and that in the competitions of the future the traits which enhance economic efficiency are likely to be most decisive.

In the dim past when cultures were sporadic, each developing apart in some island or river delta or valley closet, no race could progress unless it bore its crop of inventive genius. A high average of capacity was not so important as a few Gutenbergs and Faradays in each generation to make lasting additions to the national culture. If fruitful initiatives were forthcoming, imitation and education could be trusted to make them soon the common possession of all.

But when culture becomes cosmopolitan, as it is to-day, the success of a race turns much more on the efficiency of its average units than on the inventions and discoveries of its geniuses. The heaven-sent man who invents the locomotive, or the dynamo, or the germ theory, confers thereby no exclu-

sive advantage on his people or his race. So perfect is intellectual commerce, so complete is the organization of science, that almost at once the whole civilized world knows and profits by his achievements. Nowadays the pioneering genius belongs to mankind, and however patriotic he may be he aids most the race that is most prompt and able to exploit his invention. Parasitism of this kind, therefore, tends to annul genius as a factor in race survival. During the century just closed the French intellect has stood supreme in its contributions to civilization; yet France has derived no exclusive advantage from her men of genius. It is differences in the qualities of the common men of the rival peoples that explains why France has not doubled its population in a century, while the English stock in the meantime has peopled some of the choicest parts of the world and more than quadrupled its numbers.

Henceforth this principle of cosmopolitanism must be reckoned with. Even if the Chinese have not yet vanquished the armies of the West with Mauser rifles supplied from Belgium, there is no reason why that mediocre and intellectually sterile race may not yet defeat us industrially by the aid of machines and processes conceived in the fertile brains of our Edisons and Marconis. Organizing talent, of course,—industrial, administrative, military,—each race must, in the long run, produce from its own loins; but in the industrial Armageddon to come it may be that the laurels will be won by a mediocre type of humanity, equipped with the science and the appliances of the more brilliant and brain-fertile peoples. Not preponderance of genius will be decisive, but more and more the energy, self-reliance, fecundity, and acquired skill of the average man; and the nation will do most for itself that knows how best to foster these winning qualities by means of education and wise social institutions.

How far does moral excellence profit a race? Those who hold that *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht* tell us that the weal or woe of nations depends upon morals. Indeed,

every flourishing people lays its prosperity first to its religion, and then to its moral code. Climatic adaptation or economic capacity is the last thing to be thought of as a cause of superiority.

The chief moral trait of a winning race is *stability of character*. Primitive peoples are usually over-emotional and poised unstably between smiles and tears. They act quickly if at all, and according to the impulse of the moment. The Abyssinian, for example, is fickle, fleeting and perjured, the Kirghiz "fickle and uncertain," the Bedouin "loves and honors violent acts." The courage of the Mongol is "a sudden blaze of pugnacity" rather than a cool intrepidity. We recall Carlyle's comparing Gallic fire which is "as the crackling of dry thorns under a pot," with the Teutonic fire which rises slowly but will smelt iron. In private endeavor perseverance, in the social economy the keeping of promises, and in the state steadfastness—these are the requisites of success, and they all depend on stability of character. Reliability in business engagements and settled reverence for law are indispensable in higher social development. The great economic characteristics of this age are the tendency to association, the growth of exchange, the increasing use of capital and the greater elaborateness of organization. They all imply the spreading of business over more persons, more space, and more time, and the increasing dependence of every enterprise upon what certain persons have been appointed to do or have engaged to do. Unreliable persons who fail to do their duty or keep their promises are quickly extruded from the economic organization. Industrial evolution, therefore, places a rising premium on reflection and self-control, the foundations of character. More and more it penalizes the childishness or frivolousness of the cheaply-gotten-up, *mañana* races.

As regards the altruistic virtues, they are too common to confer a special advantage. Honesty, docility, faithfulness

and other virtues that lessen social friction abound at every stage of culture and in almost every breed. The economic virtues are a function of *race*; but the moral virtues seem rather to be a function of *association*. They do not make society; society makes them. Just as the joint secretes the lubricating synovial fluid so every settled community, if undisturbed, secretes in time the standards, ideals and imperatives which are needed to lessen friction. Good order is, in fact, so little a monopoly of the higher races that the attainment of it is more difficult among Americans at Dutch Flat or Skagway than it is among Eskimos or Indians. Sociability and sympathy are, indeed, serviceable in promoting cohesion among natural men; but they are of little account in the higher social architecture. The great races have been stern and grasping, with a strong property sense. More and more the purposive triumphs over the spontaneous association; so that the great historic social edifices are built on concurrence of aims, on custom or religion or law, never on mere brotherly feeling.

Indeed, the primary social sentiments are at variance with that sturdy self-reliance which, as we have seen, enables a race to overrun the earth. It was observed even in the California gold diggings that the French miners stayed together, while the solitary American or Briton serenely roamed the wilderness with his outfit on a burro, and made the richest "strikes." To-day a French railway builder in Tonkin says of the young French engineers in his employ: "They sicken, morally and physically, these fellows. They need papa and mamma! I had good results from bringing them together once or twice a week, keeping them laughing, making them amuse themselves and each other, in spite of lack of amusement. Then all would go well." It is perhaps this cruel homesickness which induces the French to restrict their numbers rather than expatriate themselves to over-sea colonies. Latin sociability is the fountain of many of the graces that make life worth living, but it is certainly

a handicap in just this critical epoch, when the apportionment of the earth among the races depends so much on a readiness to fight, trade, prospect or colonize thousands of miles from home.

The superiority of a race cannot be preserved without *pride of blood* and an uncompromising attitude toward the lower races. In Spanish America the easygoing and unfastidious Spaniard peopled the continent with half-breeds and met the natives half way in respect to religious and political institutions. In East Africa and Brazil the Portuguese showed toward the natives even less of that race aversion which is so characteristic of the Dutch and the English. In North America, on the other hand, the white men have rarely mingled their blood with that of the Indian or toned down their civilization to meet his capacities. The Spaniard absorbed the Indians, the English exterminated them by fair means or foul. Whatever may be thought of the latter policy, the net result is that North America from the Behring Sea to the Rio Grande is dedicated to the highest type of civilization; while for centuries the rest of our hemisphere will drag the ball and chain of hybridism.

Since the higher culture should be kept pure as well as the higher blood, that race is stronger which, down to the cultivator or the artisan, has *a strong sense of its superiority*. When peoples and races meet there is a silent struggle to determine which shall do the assimilating. The issue of this grapple turns not wholly on the relative excellence of their civilizations, but partly on the degree of faith each has in itself and its ideals. The Greeks assimilated to themselves all the peoples about the Mediterranean save the Jew, partly because the humblest wandering Greek despised "the barbarians," and looked upon himself as a missionary to the heathen. The absorbent energy of the United States probably surpasses that of any mere colony because of the stimulus given us by an independent national existence. America is a psychic maelstrom that has sucked in and swallowed up

hosts of aliens. Five millions of Germans, for instance, have joined us, and yet how little has our institutional development been deflected by them ! I dare say the few thousand university-trained Germans, and Americans educated in Heidelberg or Göttingen, have injected more German culture into our veins than all the immigrants that ever passed through Castle Garden. There is no doubt that the triumph of Americanism over these heterogeneous elements, far more decisive now than eighty years ago, has been hastened by the vast contempt that even the native farm-hand or mechanic feels for the unassimilated immigrant. Had he been less sure of himself, had he felt less pride in American ideals and institutions, the tale might have been different.

One question remains. Is the Superior Race as we have portrayed it, able to survive all competitions and expand under all circumstances? There is, I am convinced, one respect in which very foresight and will power that mark the higher race dig a pit beneath its feet.

In the presence of the plenty produced by its triumphant energy the superior race forms what the economists call "a Standard of Comfort," and refuses to multiply save upon this plane. With his native ambition stimulated by the opportunity to rise and his natural foresight reinforced by education, the American, for example, overrules his strongest instincts and refrains from marrying or from increasing his family until he can realize his subjective standard of comfort or decency. The power to form and cling to such a standard is not only one of the noblest triumphs of reason over passion, but is, in sooth, the only sure hope for the elevation of the mass of men from the abyss of want and struggle. The progress of invention held out such a hope but it has proven a mockery. Steam and machinery, it is true, ease for a little the strain of population on resources; but if the birth-rate starts forward and the slack is soon taken up by the increase of mouths, the final result is simply more people living on the old plane. The rosy glow thrown upon

the future by progress in the industrial arts proves but a false dawn unless the common people acquire new wants and raise the plane upon which they multiply.

Now, this rising standard, which alone can pilot us toward the Golden Age, is a fatal weakness when a race comes to compete industrially with a capable race that multiplies on a lower plane. Suppose, for example, Asiatics flock to this country and, enjoying equal opportunities under our laws, learn our methods and compete actively with Americans. They may be able to produce and therefore earn in the ordinary occupations, say three-fourths as much as Americans ; but if their standard of life is only half as high, the Asiatic will marry before the American feels able to marry. The Asiatic will rear two children while his competitor feels able to rear but one. The Asiatic will increase his children to six under conditions that will not encourage the American to raise more than four. Both, perhaps, are forward-looking and influenced by the worldly prospects of their children ; but where the Oriental is satisfied with the outlook the American, who expects to school his children longer and place them better, shakes his head.

Now, to such a competition there are three possible results. First, the American, becoming discouraged, may relinquish his exacting standard of decency and begin to multiply as freely as the Asiatic. This, however, is likely to occur only among the more reckless and worthless elements of our population. Second, the Asiatic may catch up our wants as well as our arts, and acquire the higher standard and lower rate of increase of the American. This is just what contact and education are doing for the French Canadians in New England, for the immigrants in the West, and for the negro in some parts of the South ; but the members of a great culture race like the Chinese show no disposition, even when scattered sparsely among us, to assimilate to us or to adopt our standards. Not until their self-complacency has been undermined at home and an extensive intellectual

ferment has taken place in China itself will the Chinese become assimilable elements. Thirdly, the standards may remain distinct, the rates of increase unequal, and the silent replacement of Americans by Asiatics go on unopposed until the latter monopolize all industrial occupations, and the Americans shrink to a superior caste able perhaps by virtue of its genius, its organization, and its vantage of position to retain for a while its hold on government, education, finance, and the direction of industry, but hopelessly beaten and displaced as a race. In other words, the American farm hand, mechanic and operative might wither away before the heavy influx of a prolific race from the Orient, just as in classic times the Latin husbandman vanished before the endless stream of slaves poured into Italy by her triumphant generals.

For a case like this I can find no words so apt as "race suicide." There is no bloodshed, no violence, no assault of the race that waxes upon the race that wanes. The higher race quietly and unobtrusively eliminates itself rather than endure individually the bitter competition it has failed to ward off from itself by collective action. The working classes gradually delay marriage and restrict the size of the family as the opportunities hitherto reserved for their children are eagerly snapped up by the numerous progeny of the foreigner. The prudent, self-respecting natives first cease to expand, and then, as the struggle for existence grows sterner and the outlook for their children darker, they fail even to recruit their own numbers. It is probably the visible narrowing of the circle of opportunity through the infiltration of Irish and French Canadians that has brought so low the native birth-rate in New England.

However this may be, it is certain that if we venture to apply to the American people of to-day the series of tests of superiority I have set forth to you at such length, the result is most gratifying to our pride. It is true that our average of energy and character is lowered by the presence in the South

of several millions of an inferior race. It is true that the last twenty years have diluted us with masses of fecund but beaten humanity from the hovels of far Lombardy and Galicia. It is true that our free land is gone and our opportunities will henceforth attract immigrants chiefly from the humbler strata of East European peoples. Yet, while there are here problems that only high statesmanship can solve, I believe there is at the present moment no people in the world that is, man for man, equal to the Americans in capacity and efficiency. We stand now at the moment when the gradual westward migration has done its work. The tonic selections of the frontier have brought us as far as they can bring us. The testing individualizing struggle with the wilderness has developed in us what it would of body, brain and character.

Moreover, free institutions and universal education have keyed to the highest tension the ambitions of the American. He has been chiefly farmer and is only beginning to expose himself to the deteriorating influences of city and factory. He is now probably at the climax of his energy and everything promises that in the centuries to come he is destined to play a brilliant and leading rôle on the stage of history.